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Abstract
We use experimental data to examine the e¤ect of ethnicity (foreign, indigenous, and mes-
tizo) and gender on trust and trustworthiness in Peru. Comparing to the foreign group, we nd
that the indigenous group is more trusted (positive discrimination), while the mestizo group
is less trustworthy (negative discrimination). Likewise, subjects reciprocate more when a male
acts as their counterpart. We further analyze whether cognitive ability, the Big Five Personality
Traits, and the social dominance orientation scale (SODS) can predict trust and trustworthi-
ness. We nd that the Cognitive Reection Test score is positively correlated with trust, while
the cumulative college GPA is negatively correlated with trustworthiness. We nd that neuroti-
cism is correlated with trusting behavior, while the SODS is (negatively) correlated with the
trustworthiness ratio.
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1 Introduction
There is a vast and growing body of literature examining discrimination in the labor market in
developed (e.g., Aigner & Cain 1977, Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004, Carlsson & Rooth 2007;
Kass & Manger, 2010) and developing countries (e.g., Galarza & Yamada 2014, Banerjee et al.
2009, Moreno et al. 2012, Bravo et al. 2009).1 For Peru, in addition to the labor market (Galarza
& Yamada 2014), other studies have analyzed the existence of discrimination in the provision of
health services (Valdivia 2010) and group formation (Castillo et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, only few studies do analyze two important aspects of the problem. First, little is
still known about the reasons behind discrimination. Second, the literature on the prevalence of
the discriminatory behavior in other contexts, beyond the labor market, is scant. In the case of
Peru, the few existing empirical studies only examine the undergraduate studentsperceptions of
discrimination, yet they do not provide a measurement for it (Kogan & Galarza, 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to ll such information gap. In particular, we aim to provide
empirical evidence of two possible reasons for discrimination stereotypes or tastes by using ex-
perimental methods in a college environment. In addition to the academic interest in disentangling
the reasons behind the observed discrimination, its practical relevance lies in the policy area: the
policy interventions depend on which the reason behind discrimination is. In principle, changing
preferences (taste-based discrimination) seems to be harder to do than changing stereotypes (sta-
tistical discrimination). Thus, while a solution for the latter could consist in providing a broader
range of information, the former requires more complex solutions, such as the development of a
greater awareness of the value of diversity.
In particular, our purpose in this paper is three-fold: First, we examine whether there a strong
discrimination in favor of students from an indigenous origin (versus those from foreign and mes-
tizo origins). Prior studies about social preferences report ethnic (Fershtman & Gneeezy 2001) and
sexual discrimination (Delavande & Zafar 2013). If the ethnic origin captures socio-economic sta-
tus then we should expect that, with everything else being constant, the expectation of helping
should explain greater transfers to this group. Second, we aim to analyz the extent to which the
possible observed discrimination is due to Stereotypes. Third, we analyze any correlation between
the trusting and trustworthy behavior and three sets of indicators: cognitive ability, the social
dominance orientation scale (SDOS), and the Big Five personality traits (extraversion, openness
to experience, neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) (Digman 1990, Golderg 1990).
In prior studies, cognitive ability tends to be correlated with strategic decision-making (Benito-
Ostolaza et al. 2016). In turn, since the SDOS captures ones preference for inequality among
social groups, we should it to be negatively correlated with pro-social altruism (Pratto et al. 1994).
In recent years, several studies examine the role of the Big Five personality traits test in decision-
making. In particular, prior studies (e.g., Corr et al. 2015) show that the agreeableness, the trait
related to kindness and warmth, is correlated with trusting behavior.
We thus examine the e¤ect of knowing the surname, which measures a sort of social distance,
1For an extensive review of recent literature on this subject, see Neumark 2016 and Bertrand & Duo 2016.
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and gender of the counterpart on the decisions taken during the Trust Game (strategic interaction)
and the Dictator Game (interaction based on generosity). Using our result from Trust Games and
Dictator Games allow us to study whether any detected e¤ect (by surnames or gender) depends
on the type of interaction (strategic or generosity-based). This also allows us to examine the
importance of stereotypes and tastes in the observed decisions. In sum, we depart from most of the
recent literature in two important ways. First, in addition to examining the existence of trusting
behavior and trustworthiness, we study the correlates of those decisions using administrative data
about tuition (which proxies for SES) and college GPA (a proxy for cognitive ability), the Big Five
Personality Traits, and social dominance orientation scale (SDOS).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most relevant litera-
ture up to date, especially concerning studies that distinguish between both types of discrimination,
and examines some correlates of decisions made in the Trust or Dictator Games. Section 3 describes
the methodology and experimental design we used, section 4 presents our main results, and section
5 makes some nal remarks.
2 Previous work
Our paper relates to two strands of the literature: social preferences and discrimination. On the one
hand, there is extensive research using double-blinded experiments to measure social preferences
(e.g., Eckel & Wilson 2004 & Berg et al. 1995). Some of them study whether decisions are a¤ected
by information about the counterpart. In particular, Levitt & List (2007) report studies in which
participants engage in more pro-social behavior, when the counterpart identity is known. This
suggests that pro-social behavior may not be fully attributable to fairness concerns (Davis & Holt
1993). When information concerning the counterparts is added (e.g., gender or ethnic origin),
one can analyze the e¤ect of knowing such information on the decisions taken. Any statistically
signicant di¤erential e¤ect, by group, can then be thought of as discrimination. On the other
hand, several studies aim to explain the reasons for discrimination, being two the main competing
theories: statistical discrimination (which states that the lack of information generates stereotypes
regarding di¤erent groups of individuals (Arrow 1973, Phelps 1972)) and taste-based discrimination
(which states that individuals may have a particular preference to interact with certain groups of
people over others (Becker 1975)).2 A priori, it is unclear which reason should prevail in each
particular interaction among individuals.
Among all the experiments measuring social preferences that can be used to capture discrimina-
tion, the Ultimatum Game, the Trust Game and the Dictator Game have been the most commonly
chosen. We will use the last two in this study, which we describe next. The Trust Game (TG) is
2Johansson-Stenman (2008) proposes a third type of discrimination, called biased perception based discrimination,
which indicates that some people are treated worse than others because they belong to a group that others mistakenly
believe to have a less favorable characteristic (If, for example, it is usual to believe that group A is less trustworthy
than the rest of groups in a society, then if group A is a minority, all members of that group are treated worse because
they have fewer people similar to them). In any case, it is hard to detect and separate this type of discrimination
from the previous two aforementioned motives. We thus will not address it in this paper.
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a sequential Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game,3 in which the rst player (the trustor) decides how
much money, from his initial money endowment, to transfer to a second player (the trustee). The
experimenter then triples that amount and gives it to the second player, who then decides how
much money (from the tripled amount) she wishes to return. A commonly stated interpretation
of this game is that the rst players decision reects her trust in the second player, which could
arise from her altruism towards and expected reciprocity from her. In turn, the second players
decision reects how trustworthy she is (positive reciprocity). Usually, the rst player transfers
about half of her initial endowment and the second player returns about half of the money she
receives (Levitt & List 2007). In these games, there is evidence of a willingness to pay to learn
certain features of the other player, such as her physical appearance (Eckel & Petrie 2011); or to
reveal ones own characteristics (Heyes & List 2016). These results suggest that information about
who the player is may a¤ect choices made.
The Dictators Game (DG), on the other hand, is a TG, without the second stage; so that any
strategic considerations by the rst player (called now the Dictator) are ruled out. The second
player now simply accepts the decision made by the rst player. Typically, in DGs, more than half
of the rst players send a positive amount of money to the second one, with an average transfer of
20% of their endowments (Levitt & List 2007). This result reveals a marked preference for giving
to the other (explained either by altruism or inequality aversion), which contradicts the prediction
of a Nash equilibrium (the dictator sends nothing), made in a context in which individuals only
worry about their own wellbeing.
Etang et al. (2011) conduct TGs, DGs and Risk Games, in order to examine the role of social
distance, as measured by community membership, on trust and altruism in Cameroon. They nd
that more money is sent to individuals from the same community (pro-social behavior) and that
the results of the TG are not correlated with attitudes towards risk (although one could expect
that, in principle, trusting behavior be correlated with the degree of risk aversion, this result shows
that this is not necessarily the case).
Charness & Gneezy (2003) conduct DGs and Ultimatum games (UGs) with two treatment
groups, one in which the second players surname was revealed to the rst player, and other (the
control group) in which no such information was disclosed. In the DG, knowing the surname of
player 2 involves transfers of higher amounts while in the UG, this information has no major e¤ect
on the amounts transferred. Thus, while generosity increases with some information about the
counterpart, such behavior appears to be crowded-out by strategic concerns.
Another branch of recent studies attempt to separate the e¤ect of statistical discrimination
from that based on tastes.4 By comparing the amounts sent in TG and UG with those sent
3The PD is a non-cooperative game, in which two individuals aim to maximize their own utility and make decisions
without knowing the other partys choice. The prediction of the game implies that each player will choose the non-
cooperative strategy, which is the worst strategy they could choose, from a social point of view.
4From a di¤erent perspective, Neilson & Ying (2016) develop a dynamic framework of analysis to examine a
di¤erent question, taking the case of hiring decisions: whether taste-based discrimination in the present (exerted by
some manager, A) can lead to statistical discrimination in the future (exerted by a di¤erent manager, B). In their
model, the rst type of discrimination arises from a non-productivity-related trait (if manager A hires more women
just because they are more attractive than male workers, the average skill of hired men is higher than that of hired
women, which allows manager B to use gender as a variable to discriminate statistically.
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in DG, Fershtman & Gneezy (2001) separate stereotypes from tastes as reasons to discriminate
among college students in Israel. They nd signicant ethnic discrimination, based on stereotypes,
which is mainly exercised by males. Other laboratory experiments that disentangle the relative
importance of statistical versus taste-based discrimination include Castillo & Petrie (2010) for
public goods experiments and group formation with undergraduate American students, and Castillo
et al. (2012a) for the taxi service in Lima, Peru. In this latter case, the authors nd evidence of
statistical discrimination against male passengers: they get higher initial and nal prices.
Gneezy et al. (2012) use information from more than 3,000 transactions in di¤erent markets (car
repair, car sales, among others) to determine the intensity of and the reasons behind discrimination.
The authors nd that when the object of discrimination is under the control of the individual
(such as the lack of e¤ort or motivation), the cause is animadversion (i.e., tastes), whereas, when
that object is perceived as being outside the control of the individual (such as race or gender),
discrimination tends to be "statistical". Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 77 experimental studies
on discrimination (which altogether contain 441 results), Lane (2016) reports that about one-third
of the studies nds discrimination (there is evidence of both types, statistical and taste-based
discrimination), that students and non-students discriminate in a similar way, and that subjects
favor the opposite gender.
Turning now to studies measuring social preferences in experiments, Sutter & Kocher (2007)
examine whether trust and trustworthiness vary across di¤erent age cohorts: 8 years, 12 years, 16
years, students (22 years old in average), professional workers (32 years old in average) and retired
people. In those games, subjects only interact with other participants from the same age group.
Their results show that trust increases monotonically from the group of primary school students (8
years) until they are 22 years old, but remains constant afterwards, unlike trustworthiness, which
is observed in all age cohorts.
Slonim and Guillen (2010) examine the nature of discrimination in TGs and whether selecting
the counterpart plays a role. In their design, in both scenarios (with and without selection), the
trustor knows the gender and an indicator of analytical ability of her counterpart (the authors
expect to nd a positive correlation between selection and trust). They nd that discrimination is
negligible when there is no selection. With selection, however, they nd signicant discrimination,
in terms of the amount sent by the trustor and of choosing her counterpart: Regardless of the
information about the ability of her counterpart, males prefer (as counterpart) and send more
to females; and vice versa. In addition, the observed discrimination is explained by tastes and
beliefs regarding the trustworthiness of each gender. Moreover, the authors do not nd a clear
relationship between gender and trustworthiness (see references cited therein, page 387).
Our study also relates to those that analyze the relationship between social distance, understood
as "the perceived distance between individuals and groups" (Encyclopedia of Psychology 2000) and
the analysis of who are more trustworthy. Johansson-Stenman (2008) uses survey data to examine
this relationship and nds that social distance, measured by indicators such as political a¢ liation,
negatively a¤ects the perception of being trustworthy in Sweden. Moreover, older people and those
living in small cities, are considered more trustworthy than young people and those living in big
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cities.
In the same fashion, Cadsby et al. (2008) analyze the role of social distance on decisions made
in TG and DG in China. The authors nd that social distance reduces the amounts transferred in
TGs, but does not reduce reciprocity. Curiously, they do not nd a correlation between altruism
in the DG and reciprocity in the TG. The authors explain this result by alluding to the di¤erent
moral considerations captured in each game (the generosity exercised over someone who cannot
respond, in the DG, is di¤erent from that observed when one can punish others in some way, in
the TG).
The existing literature, however, falls short in explaining the behavior observed in the exper-
imental games. For instance, the role of variables, such as cognitive ability or personality traits
are rarely examined. Corgnet et al. (2016) represents a notable exception. These authors nd a
positive correlation between the Frederick (2005)s Cognitive Reection Test (CRT) score and the
amount sent by the trustor, but not by the trustee, in TGs.5 This result seems consistent with the
empirical evidence indicating that individuals with higher cognitive abilities play more strategically
(Benito-Ostolaza et al., 2016).
We contribute to the existing literature, by further examining the role of cognitive ability,
captured by the CRT score and college GPA, in decisions made in the TG, in addition to the role
of the Big Five Personality Traits6 and the Social Dominance Scale.7 We ultimately analyze the
existence and nature of discrimination in the decisions made in Trust and Dictator Games, based
on ethnicity and gender.
3 Experiments
3.1 Design
We have a 2x3 within-subjects design: we implemented two types of experimental games (Trust
and Dictator Games) and the subjects were students from three ethnic groups (foreign European
or Asian origin, indigenous origin, and mestizo origin).8 Our experiments were conducted at
the Universidad del Pacíco (UP), with a sample of 558 undergraduate students, chosen by pairs
(Student A, Student B), from di¤erent semesters and majors. Using the surnames as the ethnic
marker, our sample consists of three groups: foreign-F (G1), indigenous-I (G2), and mestizo-M
(G3), as shown in Table 1.9 The pairings of each group appears in the rst row of each cell.
5An entire issue of the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics analyzes the connection between
cognitive abilities (using mostly the CRT, as a proxy variable) and economic decisions. See vol. 64, October 2016.
6 In general, the Big 5 personality traits have been used to examine their correlation with aggressive behaviors
(Barlett & Anderson 2012), but not with social preferences. An exception is Evans & Revelle (2008).
7This is an instrument used to measure the degree of preference for inequality (Michinon et al., 2005). A prior
study by Densley et al. (2014) nd that SODS is correated with low trust among gang members in London.
8Sample foreign surnames include Calmett, Dextre, and Johannson; Indigenous surnames include those with a
Quechua origin (e.g., Anchurima, Armacanqui, and Quispe) and mestizosurnames include the rest (e.g., Álvarez,
Paredes, and Calderón).
9We grouped subjects, using their full names (rst name + paternal surname + maternal surname).
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[Table 1 about here]
At rst, we wished to recruit only students taking general courses in their rst, third and fth
years, with the aim to have a representative sample of students (since all students must take those
courses). However, the lack of representativeness of students with foreign and indigenous surnames
in these courses forced us to include participants from other courses in the sample. We used the
Universidad del Pacíco registry of students to select our pairs of subjects. Our original design
considered an equal number of pairs in each group shown in Table 1. However, the recruitment of
subjects was di¢ cult and we could not balance each cell in Table 1. Once we selected the pairs of
students, part of our sample was recruited in their classrooms and part, via email invitations.10
3.1.1 Trust and Dictator Games
In our study, every Student A participated in the Trust Game (TG) and in the Dictator Game
(DG). We andomly changed the order of play for each subject: 54.35% of subjects played the TG,
followed by the DG; and the remaining 45.65% of subjects played games in the reverse order.
The TG is a sequential, two-stage game. In stage 1, Student A, the trustor, received a sealed
envelope with an endowment of 10 PEN (equivalent to 3 USD) and decides how much (denoted as
xTG)11 to transfer to Student B, the trustee. This amount may be seen as a measure of the trust she
has in Student B.12 The amount of money transferred is then tripled by the experimenter (3xTG)
and given to Student B. Under the premise that subjects want to maximize their own utility, in
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (in which each player chooses the action that maximizes
her individual payo¤s), Student B will not return anything to Student A. Given this, the latter will
not transfer anything to the former.
In our experiments, the only information that every Student A knows before making her decision
(rst stage) is the full name of Student B and her university a¢ liation (Universidad del Pacíco).
Appendix 1A shows the instructions given in this stage (see Instructions for Part I). In the
second stage of the TG, conducted a few days after Student A participated, Student B decides
how much of the amount of money received (3xTG) to transfer back to Student A (denoted as y).
Student B has the same information as her counterpart when making her decision. Appendix 1B
presents the instructions given in this stage.
Thus, in order to test for ethnic discrimination (to this point, such discrimination can be based
both on tastes and stereotypes) in the levels of trust, we will compare the di¤erence between the
average amount transferred from Students A to Students B (xTG) belonging to each ethnic group
10While some students did not attend class on the day we visited their classrooms, none of the attendees declined
to participate. On the other hand, the success rate from our email invites was roughly 26%.
11We used 1 PEN Sol coins in both stages of the TG, as well as in the DG.
12We are aware that this amount may also be a¤ected by other factors, such as altruism (Student A may be happier
when Student B has more money to consume), inequality aversion, and risk aversion (if, for some reason, Student
A does not expect Student B will transfer back anything, she would not send anything in the rst place. Studies
such as Etang et al. 2011 for Cameroon, nds, however, that the trustors decision is not a¤ected by their risk
preferences, a nding that gives us some condence that our results might not be confounded, to some extent, by
risk considerations.
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(F, I, M). We will test for gender discrimination in a similar fashion. On the other hand, to test
for discrimination in the levels of trustworthiness, we will analyze the amount of money sent back
by Student B (y)13 and the rates of return of money from Student B to Student A

y
3xTG

.
Turning to the Dictator Game (DG), Student B now becomes a passive player, who accepts any
amount sent by Student A (call this amount, xDG). Again, under the assumption that subjects
want to maximize their own utility, the unique Nash equilibrium of this game implies that Student
A does not transfer anything to Student B. Appendix 1A presents the instructions given in this
experiment (see Instructions for Part II).
In the DG, the Student Bs passiveness implies that Student A does not expect any return from
her, so that any stereotype she has about her counterpart (from any ethnic group F, I, or M or
gender), becomes irrelevant in her trusting decision, thus leaving preferencesas the only reason
for discrimination. This way, the di¤erence (xTG   xDG) gives us an indicator of the extent of
taste-based discrimination.
We will further conduct a regression analysis, using information collected in the post-experimental
survey, in order to nd the correlates of choices made in the TG. We collected information about age,
gender, ethnicity, cognitive ability (proxied by the CRT score and the cumulative college GPA),14
as well as the Big Five Personality Traits (Agreeableness, Openness to Change, Neuroticism, Con-
scientiousness and Extraversion), which capture essential personality traits (Corr et al. 2015),15
and the 16 items of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDOE), which is an instrument used
to measure the degree of preference for inequality (Michinon et al., 2005, Pratto et al. 1994).
3.2 Implementation
Our sample includes 279 Students A and their pairs (Students B). Table 2 presents the basic
descriptive statistics of our participants. As shown below, our subjects are about 19 years old, have
a cumulative college GPA of 13.6 (in a 0-to-20 scale), are in their fourth or fth academic semester
(with 80 credits accumulated, out of 200 credits), 46% are women, 30% have an indigenous-sounding
surname, 40% have mestizo surnames and 30% have surnames of foreign origin (mainly European).
These characteristics are similar for Students A and B. Moreover, the three main majors represented
in our sample include Economics and Finance (between 31% and 46% of the sample, depending
on whether it is Student A or Student B), Business Administration (between 27% and 36%) and
Entrepreneurial Engineering (14%).
[Table 2 about here]
13For positive amounts of xTG, y also represents an indicator of positive reciprocity.
14The CRT has shown to be correlated with cognitive abilities in previous studies (e.g., Frederick, 2005). Never-
theless, other studies suggest that, rather than cognitive reection (which is the ability to reect before giving an
impulsive, and wrong answer), the CRT seems to capture numerical intelligence (e.g., Sinayev & Peters 2015, Welsh
et al. 2013).
15Agreeableness captures the tendency to be helpful and cooperative. Openness to change reects curiosity. Neu-
roticism captures a persons tendency to experience negative emotions, such as anxiety and anger. Extraversion is
often associated with energy and sociability; and Responsibility reects the tendency to be organized and disciplined.
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The data collection process was carried out in two periods, between November 8 and 30, 2016
and between January 11 and 30, 2017. As mentioned earlier, the experiments were conducted in
two settings: the classrooms, with the consent of the instructors; and in previously arranged rooms
and dates, scheduled via e-mail invites. Our experiments lasted for about 30 minutes, on average,
for both types of Students. Participants did not receive a participation show-up fee; their monetary
winnings came exclusively from the experiments in which they participated.
4 Results
One of our main aims is to determine if participants (Students A and B) show a systematic pref-
erence for members of a particular ethnic group and/or gender, acting as their counterparts, and
whether the discrimination is statistical or taste-based. Thus, we present next the descriptive sta-
tistics and means di¤erence tests by ethnic group (section 4.1). The subsequent section (section
4.2) respond to our second goal, wich is to examine whether cognitive ability (measured by the CRT
score and the cumulative college GPA), the Big Five Personality Traits, and the social orientation
dominance scale, a¤ect the decisions made in the games analyzed, in a context of linear regressions.
4.1 Behavior in the Trust and Dictator Games
Table 3 and Figure 1 summarize the behavior found in the Trust Games. As shown in Table 3,
the average amount (and median amount) sent by the trustor is 5.05 PEN (transfer of 50% of
the endowment). Disaggregating by the ethnicity of the trustor (rows) and trustee (columns), we
can observe that the former sends, on average, a larger amount to the members of the Indigenous
group, both with respect to Foreigners (p-value is 0.0154) and Mestizos (p-value is 0.0334) (see the
lower panel of the table, Total). These di¤erences, however, remain only marginally signicant
for the group of trustors with Foreign surnames (see upper panel). Overall, these results suggest
the existence of a positive discrimination in favor of the group with Indigenous surnames.
[Table 3 about here]
Figure 1 shows the average amounts sent by the trustor, divided by gender and ethnic group,
of the trustor (top panel, A) and the trustee (bottom panel, B). Who are more trusting? While,
in general, we see (panel A) that male trustors send more than female trustors, this di¤erence by
gender is only signicant for the case of the Foreign group of trustors. Secondly, while the trustees
from the indigenous group receive more money than those from other ethnic groups, disaggregating
by gender, such di¤erence does not appear to be statistically signicant (panel B). The means tests
of the average amounts sent by female and male trustors conrm the inexistence of any signicant
di¤erence by gender of the recipient (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
[Figure 1 about here]
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Turning now to the Dictator Game, the average amount transferred by Student A, to members
of each of the three ethnic groups under scrutiny is not statistically di¤erent (see bottom panel
of Table 4). However, Students A with a foreign surname do send larger amounts to Students B
of indigenous origin, as compared to those of the mestizo group. Thus, if there is any positive
discrimination in favor of the indigenous group, this would come from Students A of foreign origin
and is likely to be based on preferences, rather than stereotypes. Performing a regression analysis
on the amount sent, similar to that for the Trust Game, did not yield any signicant result, which
means that the subjects focused on the Trust Game, as we expected (unreported table).
[Table 4 about here]
Why would Students A send larger amounts of money to Students B from the Indigenous group
in the TG? One possibility is that they expected a di¤erent response from a Student B, depending
on her ethnic origin. In other words, if the stereotype that members of the Indigenous group
return more than another group, Foreign or Mestizoexists, it would then be justied to send, on
average, larger amounts to indigenous students, in which case we would be talking about statistical
discrimination. On average, each Student B sends back 6 PEN to Student A, which represents
34.14% of the amount they received (which is 3 times the amount sent by a typical Student A) (see
Table 2, lower panel).
Table 5 reports the average amounts returned by Students B for each 1 PEN received (between
0 and 10 PEN, shown in columns), according to their ethnic origin (rows). As seen below, for each
column, in general, members of di¤erent ethnic groups send di¤erent amounts. The small number
of observations for each category precludes testing for mean di¤erences to verify the statistical
signicance of such di¤erences.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 6 shows the average amounts sent back by the receiver, according to the receivers (top
panel) and the senders ethnic group (bottom panel). As seen below, male Students B send sig-
nicantly more than females, for each ethnic group. Moreover, the average amount sent by an
indigenous Student B is 7.00 PEN, which is signicantly larger than that sent by a mestizo Student
B, 5.52 PEN (p-value is 0.0349) and by a foreign Student B, 5.69 PEN (p-value is 0.0571). The last
three columns show the relative return of sending 1 PEN to Student B. This indicator accounts
for the amount sent by Student A. In this case, a typical indigenous Student B sends back 36.15%
of the amount she receives, and this proportion is signicantly larger than that sent by a mestizo
Student B, 28.56% (p-value is 0.0438), but we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions
with a foreign Student B, 32.62% (p-value is 0.1996).
[Table 6 about here]
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On the other hand, Students B also tend to send signicantly more money to a male counterpart,
overall and within each ethnic group (bottom panel). In particular, accounting for the amount
received by Student B, a male white Student A receives signicantly, in a statistical sense, more
(41.50%) than a white female (32.96%). Similar situation is faced by an indigenous male versus
an indigenous female (38.60% vs 31.11%), although in this case, such di¤erence is marginally
signicant.
A possible explanation for why Students B (trustees) send some money back to Students A
(trustors) is because they are adverse to inequality. To contrast inequality aversion (IA), if x is
the amount sent by the trustor and y is the amount returned by the trustee, when x  2 we know
that a trustee motivated by the IA should choose not to return anything (i.e., y = 0), because any
amount returned would increase the inequality between the trustor and the trustee. On the other
hand, if x > 2, IA trustees should send back some positive amount, in order to reduce inequality
(Sutter & Kocher 2007 carry out a similar analysis for Cameroon). In contrast to this, a trustee
who is motivated only by reciprocity considerations should send back a positive amount, whenever
she receives something from the trustor (x > 0).
In our sample, 82.59% of the trustees are inequality averse (IA). This group has a similar
cumulative college GPA (p-value is 0.3274) than the non-inequality averse. Likewise, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of equal CRT scores with the non-inequality averse (p-value is 0.4018).
Unsurprisingly, IA trustees send signicantly more money to the trustors, compared to those who
are not IA (on average, 6.93 PEN vs. 1.60 PEN). On the other hand, 93.33% of the trustees are
reciprocal and their CRT scores and cumulative college GPA are statistically indistinguishable
from those who are not. They send, on average, 6.42 PEN, compared to 0 PEN sent by the
non-reciprocal trustees.
Does it pay to trust? The average rate of return is high (18.81%: from every 5.05 PEN received,
6.00 PEN are sent back). As seen in Figure 2, sending small amounts of money (up to 3 PEN) has a
negative return, probably due to some punishment from the trustee, for such a smalltransfer. On
the other hand, the return to trust (reciprocity) increases monotonically, for transfers of at least 4
PEN. In particular, note that trusting completely is very protable (rate of return of around 40%).
[Figure 2 about here]
4.2 Understanding the decisions made in the TG
The trustors decision of how much money to send in the TG can be based on her perception of
how trustworthy the recipient/trustee is, and this belief may be based on ethnicity (or any other
observable variable). And this perception could be inuenced by the trustees ethnic group or
gender, in addition to her own characteristics. In this section, we examine how a set of individual
variables a¤ects the decisions made in the TG, in a linear regression context. Some of the variables of
interest include the CRT score, the cumulative college GPA, the SDOS and the Big Five personality
traits. The Figures below show a tendency for males to exhibit higher CRT scores than females
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(both acting as trustors and trustees) for each ethnic group (Figure 3), and a very homogeneous
academic performance across gender and ethnic groups (Figure 4).
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
Table 7 reports the results from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions on the amount
sent (in PEN) by the trustor in the TG. As mentioned earlier, we aim to examine the role of
ethnicity, gender, cognitive ability, personality traits and the social dominance orientation scale on
the amounts sent. Our regressions include the age, the number of accumulated credits (which serves
as a proxy for university experience) and the order of the games (whether the sequence TGDG or
DGTG was played), as control variables in columns 3 to 5.
As shown below, male trustors send (trust) more (the coe¢ cient of Male Trustor is positive);
they do not have any particular preference for the same or the opposite gender in explaining their
sending behavior (the coe¢ cient of Male Trustee is not signicant). Moreover, indigenous trustees
receive between 0.7 PEN and 0.9 PEN more, comparing to foreign trustees (see columns 1 to 4).
In column 5, we include the SES (captured by the highest two tuition scales dummy variable), the
coe¢ cient of the Indigenous variable turns insignicant (because this group has signicantly lower
SES, as measured above). As for the ability, the coe¢ cient of the CRT score is positively correlated
(at 5% or 1% level of signicance) with trusting behavior, a result that is robust to the inclusion of
controls such as university experience, major chosen, SES, and order of the games played. A more
reective behavior (captured by a higher CRT score), thus seems positively correlated with trusting
others. In contrast with that, the coe¢ cient of the cumulative college GPA is not signicant in any
of the specications considered. This result suggest that GPA and CRT are measuring di¤erent
dimensions of abilities.
Lastly, in terms of the Big Five personality traits and the SDOS, only the coe¢ cient of neuroti-
cism is correlated with trust (at 5% level of signicance).16 One may interpret this result as follows:
subjects in our sample, who are more concerned with adequacy (and score high in neuroticism),
tend to be more cooperative/trust more. Unlike Evans & Revelle (2008), however, we do not nd
that agreeableness is correlated with trust.
[Table 7 about here]
In the case of the OLS regression for the trustees decision, the dependent variable has two
specications: the absolute amount, in PEN, sent back to the trustor (reported in Table 8), and the
16 It is worth mentioning that each of the personality traits scores and SODS are standarized using its respective
samples mean and standard deviation, for easy of interpretation. As expected, the results are qualitatively the same
if we use the raw scores.
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proportion that such amount represents with respect to the amount received (the trustworthiness
ratio) (reported in Table 9). In the latter case, we are controlling for the amount received, so that
we are comparing among trustees who received the same amount. The explanatory variables in
both cases are the same as in Table 7. The rst four columns in Tables 7 and 8 do not include the
amount received from the trustor, while the fth column does.
As shown in Table 8, trustees tend to favor male trustors. Likewise, trustees tend to send
smaller amounts to people from the mestizo group, as compared to those from the foreign group
(both coe¢ cients are signicant only at 10% level), in the rst four specications (columns 1 to 4).
All these e¤ects turn insignicant when we include the amount received from the trustor (column
5).
In terms of our indicators of cognitive ability, a higher cumulative college GPA is negatively
correlated with trustworthiness across all specications considered (see columns 3 to 5), while the
coe¢ cient of the CRT scores is insignicant. A plausible explanation for this result is that students
with higher GPAs tend to make more strategic decisions, and thus seek to maximize their gains over
others who have more altruistic or reciprocal considerations. Furthermore, none of the coe¢ cients
of the Big Five Personality traits or the SDOS is signicant. Finally, Does it pay to trust? As
shown in column 5, it does: on average, for each 1 PEN sent by the trustor (trustees receive 3
PEN), trustees send back 1.5 PEN (50% of the amount received). This result is similar to that of
Etang et al. (2011) and Glaeser et al. (2000), with the di¤erence that, in the former case, this was
the only signicant variable in their regression analysis on the amount sent back by the trustees.
Turning now to the analysis of the trustworthiness ratio (Table 9), the only signicant coe¢ -
cients are those of the cumulative college GPA and the social dominance orientation scale: subjects
with higher college GPAs and those who have a stronger preference for inequality exhibit a lower
trustworthiness ratio. No e¤ect from any personality trait is observed. Furthermore, again, when
we include the standardized amount sent by the trustor in the regression (see column 5), we nd
that a one-standard-deviation increase in such an amount, increases the trustworthiness ratio by
7.3%.
[Table 8 about here]
[Table 9 about here]
5 Concluding remarks
In this study, we use experiments to analyze peoplesbehavior in Peru. In particular, we examine
whether college students favor members of certain ethnic groups or gender in Trust Games. The
study of trust and trustworthiness seems relevant in a college context, where collaboration may be a
signicant part of the undergraduate studies experience. We nd a moderate level of trust (trustors
send, on average, 50% of their endowments), which is greater towards individuals with indigenous-
sounding surnames (as compared to those with foreign-sounding surnames). We interpret this as
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positive discrimination in favor of indigenous subjects. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this is
due to preferences or not. Moreover, we nd that the mestizo group is less trustworthy, as compared
to the foreign group. We interpret this as discrimination against the mestizos. Similarly, subjects
reciprocate more when a male is their counterpart.
In terms of the other correlates of trust and trustworthiness, we nd that the CRT score is
positively correlated with trusting behavior but not with trustworthiness, while the cumulative
college GPA is negatively correlated with trustworthiness, but not with trusting behavior. This
result suggests that either the CRT score may not be properly measuring cognitive ability (unlike
the college GPA) or, alternatively, that the college GPA in our sample may not be capturing
cognitive ability. In either case, the statistical relationship between those two measures is not
signicant.
Furthermore, unlike other studies such as Corr et al. (2015) who nd agreeableness to be
correlated with trust the only signicant personality trait in our analysis is neuroticism (that
is correlated with trusting behavior). One could argue that the concern with adequacy, which is
one of the factors dening neutoricism, may have played a role in explaining trusting behavior.
Interestingly, we nd that the social dominance orientation scale (SDOS), which measures peoples
preference for inequality among social groups, appears negatively correlated with the trustworthi-
ness ratio. Taken together, these results provide some support for including personality traits and
other measures of preferences, such as the SODS, in the analysis of economic decision-making.
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Figure 1: Amount Sent by the Trustor, According to Ethnic Group and Gender of the Trustor and
Trustee: Trust Game
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Figure 2: Expected gains to the Trustees in the Trust Game
(In PEN)
8
10
12
14
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 G
ai
n 
fo
r t
he
 T
ru
st
or
 (P
EN
)
0 2 4 6 8 10
Amount Sent by the Trustor (PEN)
ExpectedGainA 95% CI
Fi tted values
20
Figure 3: Trustors and Trustees: CRT Scores
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Figure 4: Trustors and Trustees: Cumulative GPA
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Table 1: Selected Subjects, by Ethnic A¢ liation
(In Pairs)
Student B
F I M Total
F 26 24 32 82
I 22 23 36 81
M 39 34 43 116
St
ud
en
t
A
Total 87 81 111 279
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Table 2: Subjects Descriptive Statistics
Student A (Trustor) Student B (Trustee)
Age 19.53 [16, 25] 19.45 [16, 25]
Cumulative GPA 13.62 [9.52, 17.41] 13.58 [8.94, 16.88]
CRT Score 1.35 [0, 3] 1.34 [0, 3]
Cumulated No. of credits 85.01 [0, 244] 80.42 [0, 224]
Female (%) 45.52 46.95
Ethnicity
Indigenous (%) 29.03 29.03
Mestizo (%) 41.58 39.78
Foreign (%) 29.39 31.18
Major
Econ & Finance 31.41 45.56
Business Administration 36.46 27.41
Entrepren. Engineering 13.36 14.44
International Business 9.75 7.41
Big Five Personality Traitsa
Agreeableness 0.0435 [-3.37, 1.98] -0.0977 [-6.94, 1.98
Responsability 0.0556 [-3.31, 2.42] -0.0442 [-5.53, 2.10]
Openness -0.0438 [-3.24, 2.61] 0.0366 [-7.14, 2.61]
Extraversion -0.0145 [-3.27, 2.15] -0.3726 [-5.97, 2.14]
Neuroticism -0.0278 [-3.20, 2.06] 0.0176 [-7.14, 2.61]
Social Dominance (SDOS)a 0.0900 [-1.76, 4.34] -0.0639 [-1.75, 3.00]
Trust Game
Amount Sent (PEN) 5.05 [0, 10] 6.00 [0, 30]
% Sent 50.50 34.14b
Dictator Game
Amount Sent (PEN) 3.98 [0, 10] n.a.
Number of observations 279 279
Range is shown in square brackets.
a The Big Five Personality Traits and the SDOS scores are standardized, using the samples average & standard deviation.
b It only includes those who received a positive amount from Student A.
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Table 3: Amount sent by the Trustor, According to the Trustees Ethnic Group in the Trust Game
(PEN)
Trustee Means Testsa
Foreign Indigenous Mestizo Total F vs I F vs M I vs M
Avg 4.88 6.25 5.06 5.35 -1.37 -0.18 1.19
Range [0, 10] [1, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 3.06 3.07 3.46 3.24
Fo
re
ig
n
N 26 24 32 82
Avg 4.64 5.43 4.72 4.90 -0.80 -0.09 0.71
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [2, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.56 3.47 2.24 2.71
In
di
ge
no
us
N 22 23 36 81
Avg 4.62 5.41 4.86 5.02 -0.80y -0.25 0.55
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [1, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.52 2.81 2.86 2.72
M
es
ti
zo
N 39 34 43 123
Avg 4.70 5.67 4.87 5.05 -0.97 -0.17 0.79
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.67 3.07 2.85 2.88
T
ot
al
N 87 81 111 279
a Two-sided T test on the equality of means, assuming unequal variances.
* (**) Di¤erence is signicant at 10% (5%) level.
y p-value = 0.1029.
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Table 4: Amount sent by Student A, According to Student Bs Ethnic Group in the Dictator Game
(PEN)
Student B Means Testsa
Foreign Indigenous Mestizo Total F vs I F vs M I vs M
Avg 4.12 5.08 3.81 4.28 -0.96 0.31 1.27
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.64 3.17 2.18 2.67
Fo
re
ig
n
N 26 24 32 82
Avg 3.00 4.17 4.50 4.00 -1.17y -1.50 -0.33
Range [0, 8] [0, 10] [1, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.31 3.60 2.36 2.79
In
di
ge
no
us
N 22 23 36 81
Avg 4.00 3.56 3.67 3.75 0.44 0.33 -0.11
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.26 2.52 2.35 2.36
M
es
ti
zo
N 39 34 43 116
Avg 3.78 4.19 3.98 3.98 -0.41 -0.20 0.21
Range [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10] [0, 10]
Std Dev 2.41 3.08 2.31 2.58
T
ot
al
N 87 81 111 279
a Two-sided T test on the equality of means, assuming unequal variances.
* (**) Di¤erence is signicant at 10% (5%) level.
y p-value = 0.1011.
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Table 5: Average Amount Returned by the Trustee, According to Ethnic Group and Amount
Received from the Trustor
Amount Sent by the Trustor (PEN)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Amount returned by Foreign 1.50 1.78 1.89 3.83 5.11 6.33 9.75 12.80 13.50 14.44
[2] [9] [19] [12] [18] [3] [4] [5] [2] [9]
Amount returned by Indigenous 3.00 2.11 1.33 4.89 4.94 6.20 7.75 7.67 14.24
[1] [9] [9] [9] [17] [5] [4] [3] [21]
Amount returned by Mestizo 0.00 1.55 1.15 3.81 5.33 6.86 8.50 10.00 14.30
[2] [22] [13] [21] [21] [7] [3] [1] [20]
Number of observations in square brackets
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Table 6: Average Amount Returned by the Trustee, According to Ethnic Group and Amount
Received from the Trustor
(Means Tests)
Transfer, y, PEN Relative Return
  y
3x

Female Male Total Female Male Total
White 4.67 6.95** 5.69 0.3262 0.3659 0.3439
Indigenous 5.49 8.86*** 7.00 0.3615 0.3813 0.3704
Mestizo 4.47 6.76** 5.52 0.2856 0.3579** 0.3188
T
ru
st
ee
Total 4.83 7.42*** 6.00 0.3203 0.3671** 0.3414
White 5.13 9.94*** 7.01 0.3296 0.4150** 0.3631
Indigenous 4.71 7.00*** 5.78 0.3111 0.3860* 0.3462
Mestizo 4.67 6.26** 5.44 0.3192 0.3266 0.3228
T
ru
st
or
Total 4.83 7.42*** 6.00 0.3203 0.3671** 0.3414
* (**) [***] Di¤erence is signicant at 10% (5%) [1%] level.
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Table 7: OLS Regression results on the amount sent by the Trustor (Trust Game)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Trustor 1.1179 0.8833 0.9664 1.0539 0.9051
(0.3475) (0.3705) (0.4076) (0.4084) (0.4183)
Male Trustee 0.0273 0.0884 -0.1879 -0.0838 0.0263
(0.3388) (0.3380) (0.3475) (0.3570) (0.3697)
Trustee is Mestizo 0.1318 -0.1425 -0.1492 -0.1562 -0.2281
(0.3884) (0.3847) (0.3865) (0.3926) (0.3984)
Trustee is Indigenous 0.9294 0.8802 0.7896 0.7388 0.6908
(0.4389) (0.4431) (0.4268) (0.4350) (0.4474)
CRT Score 0.4901 0.3880 0.4513 0.4943
(0.1613) (0.1813) (0.1835) (0.1848)
Cumulat. college GPA -0.0111 -0.0036 -0.0155 0.0092
(0.1233) (0.1308) (0.1306) (0.1343)
Agreeablenessa 0.2129 0.1708 0.1517
(0.1881) (0.1851) (0.1804)
Opennessa -0.2292 -0.1958 -0.2202
(0.1705) (0.1693) (0.1721)
Neuroticisma 0.4618 0.5072 0.4204
(0.2028) (0.1992) (0.2106)
Extraversiona 0.0600 0.0159 0.0293
(0.1814) (0.1803) (0.1850)
Conscientiousnessa -0.2356 -0.2449 -0.2241
(0.1960) (0.2009) (0.2082)
Social Dominancea -0.0280 -0.0068 -0.0051
(0.1767) (0.1817) (0.1873)
N 279 257 257 254 242
R-squared 0.0583 0.1047 0.1467 0.1446 0.1735
Fixed E¤ects No No No Major Major, SESb
Summerb Summerb
Note: all regressions include age and a constant. Columns (3) to (5) include the num. of accumulated credits
and order of the games (TG-DG or DG-TG), as controls.
a We standardized the scores for these variables, using their respective sample mean and standard deviations.
b SESis a dummy for the highest two tuition scales. Summeris a dummy for sessions ran during
January 2017 (as opposed to 2016).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
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Table 8: OLS Regression results on Amount Sent by the Trustee (Trust Game)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Trustor 2.703 2.308 2.284 2.380 0.391
(0.674) (0.648) (0.657) (0.678) (0.350)
Male Trustee 0.0378 -0.595 -0.333 -0.197 -0.286
(0.646) (0.630) (0.673) (0.722) (0.402)
Trustor is Mestizoa -1.785 -1.487 -1.358 -1.475 -0.635
(0.836) (0.765) (0.779) (0.813) (0.393)
Trustor is Indigenousa -1.405 -1.176 -0.906 -0.836 0.0966
(0.901) (0.843) (0.862) (0.890) (0.419)
CRT Score -0.0661 -0.166 -0.0598 0.246
(0.274) (0.289) (0.294) (0.153)
Cumulat. college GPA -0.377 -0.495 -0.618 -0.324
(0.210) (0.232) (0.243) (0.117)
Agreeablenessb 0.101 0.0338 0.396
(0.334) (0.342) (0.193)
Opennessb 0.0467 0.00930 -0.236
(0.328) (0.333) (0.193)
Neuroticismb 0.187 0.254 0.224
(0.346) (0.358) (0.209)
Extraversionb -0.418 -0.332 -0.285
(0.333) (0.338) (0.175)
Conscientiousnessb -0.136 -0.0875 0.0366
(0.312) (0.321) (0.169)
Social Dominanceb -0.525 -0.497 -0.0449
(0.337) (0.347) (0.163)
Amount Received from Trustor 1.524
(PEN) (0.0680)
N 269 249 245 239 239
R squared 0.0766 0.0788 0.1080 0.1150 0.7790
Fixed E¤ects No No No Major,SESc Major,SESc
Summerc Summerc
Note: all regressions include age & a constant. Columns (3) to (5) include the num. of accumulated credits as control.
a The omitted category is the (Trustor belongs to the) Foreign group.
b We standardized the scores for these variables, using their respective samples mean and standard deviations.
c SESis a dummy for the highest two tuition scales. Summeris a dummy for sessions ran during
January 2017 (as opposed to 2016).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
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Table 9: OLS Regression results on the Proportion Sent by the Trustee (Trust Game)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male Trustor 0.0481 0.0391 0.0301 0.0394 0.0065
(0.0252) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0226)
Male Trustee -0.0172 -0.0426 -0.0294 -0.0185 -0.0200
(0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0265)
Trustor is Mestizoa -0.0417 -0.0416 -0.0262 -0.0362 -0.0223
(0.0305) (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0292) (0.0273)
Trustor is Indigenousa -0.0192 -0.0167 0.0059 0.0066 0.0221
(0.0340) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0335) (0.0311)
CRT Score 0.0082 0.0066 0.0119 0.0170
(0.0111) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0110)
Cumulat. college GPA -0.0155 -0.0224 -0.0324 -0.0276
(0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0093) (0.0090)
Agreeablenessb 0.0042 0.0025 0.0038
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0024)
Opennessb -0.0016 -0.0025 -0.0034
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Neuroticismb 0.0024 0.0030 0.0029
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Extraversionb -0.0031 -0.0024 -0.0022
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Conscientiousnessb 0.0015 0.0017 0.0021
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Social Dominanceb -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0016
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
STD Amount Sent by Trustorc 0.0727
(0.0120)
N 269 249 245 239 239
R squared 0.0228 0.0425 0.1122 0.1582 0.2851
Fixed E¤ects No No No Major, SESd Major,SESd
Summerd Summerd
Note: all regressions include age & a constant. Columns (3) to (5) include the num. of accumulated credits as control.
a The omitted category is the (Trustor belongs to the) Foreign group.
b We standardized the scores for these variables, using their respective samples mean and standard deviations.
c Standardized amount sent by the trustor.
d SESis a dummy variable for the highest two tuition scales. Summeris a dummy for sessions ran during
January 2017 (as opposed to 2016).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10; p < 0:05; p < 0:01:
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